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Weakness in Numbers: A Brief Introduction 
RYAN G. GANZENMULLER† 
MATTHEW A. ELDRED†† 
As modern science and mathematics penetrate the legal 
world, statistical analysis has found approval as a source of 
evidence and sometimes even truth itself. Whether due to 
efficiency, faith, or perhaps even lack of genuine interest, 
society seems willing to accept numerical representations of 
data as true without any curiosity as to their creation. 
Though statistics may seem like hard facts, the legal 
community should be thoughtful and wary in consuming 
these representations. 
The use of statistics differs from traditional evidence in 
two main ways. First, statistics are aggregations of 
underlying facts, and this aggregation process can conceal 
drastic mistakes and personal biases—hiding forever what 
might otherwise inspire lively debate. Second, while 
traditional evidence illustrates the world as it actually exists, 
statistics often fail—or perhaps even attempt—to incorporate 
obvious truths about the real world. The first two Articles we 
present in this first issue of Volume 63 offer examples of 
when reliance on statistics—whether due to a zealous search 
for scarce evidence or a religious trust in information 
purportedly possessing the cold calculation of science—has 
led the legal community astray. 
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In Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s 
Conservatives, Todd E. Pettys analyzes a highly publicized 
study of the Supreme Court by Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, 
and Christopher Parker. Pettys illustrates how the 
aggregation of large amounts of data can conceal blunders 
and biases in the statistical process that clearly affect what 
purports to be rigorous statistical analysis.1 While it may be 
true that small mistakes do not affect a larger outcome, is the 
law ever ready to knowingly accept such clear errors? If so, 
at what point do such errors become intolerable? We would 
argue that known biases or mistakes have no place in the 
realm of the law and the search for truth. But if bias is an 
inherent part of human nature, can there ever be a statistical 
study rigorous enough to indict the most reverend construct 
of our legal system? 
In P-Values, Priors, and Procedure in Antidiscrimination 
Law, Jason R. Bent calls for a “Bayesian revolution” in the 
use of statistics in antidiscrimination lawsuits and an end to 
the blind faith in a statistic used to prove the value of other 
statistics—the “p-value.”2 A Bayesian system would help 
expose the follies like the one in the following example: if a 
coin is flipped ten times, what are the chances that every flip 
would produce a heads? But what if the coin has been 
tampered with and has a head on both sides? The coin is 
inherently biased in favor of heads, and not knowing this 
would produce drastically inaccurate calculations. 
Incorporating more information—information about what 
really exists in the world—into one’s statistics can make a 
highly unlikely event inevitable.  
To relate this concept to Pettys’s piece, how does bias in 
the judgment of the statistician’s observation protocol affect 
the final values he calculates? When coding a close call, is the 
statistician flipping a double-headed coin? A Bayesian 
system would incorporate known truths about the world into 
statistical predictions, thereby at least attempting to bend 
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them to the world rather than induce the study’s consumers 
to bend the world to the statistics. 
In addition to Pettys’s Article in this January issue of 
Volume 63, the Buffalo Law Review is pleased to host a set of 
four Responses in our subsequent April issue. Christina L. 
Boyd,3 Timothy M. Hagle,4 Carolyn Shapiro,5 and Edward 
Whelan6 comment on the state of empirical legal studies and 
the divide between Pettys and Epstein, showcasing the 
opinions of leading scholars in the area to round out our 
discussion of this salient topic. 
Legal advocates and scholars are, by nature, hungry for 
information. Statistics promise to feed that hunger with 
infallibility, simplicity, and impartiality. But that 
information is sometimes only empty calories, and a 
confident statistician may wind up practicing alchemy.7 The 
practice of law—with life, liberty, and property on the line—
should not settle for mere mirages or fool’s gold. At a time 
when so many already believe the game is fixed, why are we 
increasing our reliance on tools that make even more efficient 
mistakes and conceal even more biases? We must seek the 
truth in the world directly, lest we find the scales of justice 
replaced with loaded dice. Who would care to risk one’s job or 
life on the flip of a two-headed coin? 
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